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The Role of the U.S. Government in Encouraging
Technological Innovation
Jack C. Williams*

M assive world forces of change are restructuring companies, whole industries, such as petrochemicals, automobiles, and electronics, and
even entire economies including China and the Soviet Union. It is these
forces of change and their widespread impact which have substantially
raised the level of debate regarding the role of government in encouraging technological innovation. At least five such forces can be identified.
The first force is the existence of world markets for most products,
services, capital flows and labor skills. The United States and Canada are
part of that world market. Thus, a business person does not have to be
an exporter to be in the world market and to experience its impact. All
one has to do is "be in business."
Second, the veritable explosion in new technology is making products, capital equipment, processing techniques and human skills obsolete
in a time frame of years rather than decades. Examples include new
materials, high definition television, superconductivity, cloning techniques, advanced manufacturing and so forth. Some of the leadership in
these new technologies is taking place not in North America, but
elsewhere.
The dramatic rate at which new technology is being made available
puts a premium on our ability to quickly translate each new technological development into new products or processes for the world marketplace. There is a big potential pay-off for the first firm to make a product
for that market, and there is little payoff for firms that try to stick with
an old product too long. If, as some estimates reveal, about 40% of the
U.S. economic growth in the 1960s and 1970s was due to technology,
think of what that figure must be today, and what it will be tomorrow!
In fact, Ed Denison has calculated that between 1929 and 1982 innovation was responsible for 64% of the gains in U.S. labor productivity.'
A third force of change is the targeted industry strategies of our
competitors, wherein it is public policy today to become world leaders,
not only in major commodity markets such as automobiles and consumer
electronics, but also in critical technologies such as the ones mentioned
* Director, Office of Technology Policy, Technology Administration, U.S. Department of
Commerce.
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above which are the seed corn for hundreds, indeed, thousands of new
products and better ways to produce those products and services.
A fourth world force of change is the ability of so many newly industrialized countries to combine high technology with low labor costs
and raw materials to produce inexpensive, sophisticated, high quality
products and services in addition to high volume commodity goods such
as petrochemicals. For example, Korea can now underprice Japan by
30%. Such competitors do not have the massive domestic market or
technology base we do and they must export to survive. Their primary
target is our market. They have the "attacker's advantage," combined
with economic growth as their top national priority.
A fifth force is the growing labor shortage combined with the critical issues of worker literacy and retrainability, a major problem in this
country. In the United States, 20 million adults are functionally illiterate, 20 million more are marginal, and 50% of U.S. industrial workers
read at the eighth grade level or below. An official of a large U.S. multinational company remarked, "It was an awful shock when we assessed
the work force in one of our plants and found that 87% of our employees
were incapable of doing work beyond the fifth grade."
It is in the context of these world forces of change and the acceptance by many knowledgeable observers that the effective management of
technology is the key to economic growth, trade and national security,
that we observe the mounting debate on the role of government in innovation. Note that I emphasized not the creation of technology, but its
management in a total business and competitiveness context. The creation of technology has never been a problem in the United States. What
happens afterwards is the main challenge.
The government's role is often perceived as complex and particularly challenging for a number of reasons. One reason is it often appears
difficult to separate policies on technological innovation from policies on
national defense, policies on fiscal and monetary policy, policies on regulations such as antitrust and product liability, policies on human resources and policies affecting activities downstream in the process of
technological innovation including manufacturing and marketing. Another reason is that the existence of competing multiple priorities can
appear to conflict, such as measures to foster full employment on the one
hand, and measures to increase productivity on the other, or measures to
curtail inflation, yet not stifle growth. Moreover, many people now properly question whether industrial prowess in world markets is assured
merely through preeminence in basic science and invention.
Another complication is how a government's role in technological
innovation can be separated for analytical or policy purposes from its
role in supporting industry in general. Examples are data collection and
analysis, antitrust policy, analysis of industry conditions and foreign regulations, application of trade and export control laws, tax policy, provision of measurement methods and services, provision of metric

Williams-ROLE OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

information and so forth. These are in addition to direct support of innovation such as the Small Business Innovation Research Program, the Offices of Research and Technical Applications in federal laboratories, the
National Science Foundation's Engineering Research Centers and
Industry-University Centers, patent protection, the innovation programs
at the Defense Department and the technology-related initiatives in the
1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act.
Another question concerns the current shortage of labor and the
tendency toward full employment in some areas. What effect will this
have? Will local governments in these areas tend to shy away from expensive technology development and commercialization initiatives due to
the expectation that such initiatives may no longer be needed? What
effect would this reaction have on the nation's long-term ability to stay
competitive?
Should the government view the European Economic Community's
move to uniformity in 1992 as an experiment to be watched cautiously or
as an inevitable evolution of the world economy, and thereby help prepare business not simply to react to a united Europe but to take leadership positions at the earliest possible time? Integration of Eastern and
Western European economies may be just around the corner. Are we
prepared?
Suppose that informed opinion holds that a nation will lose leadership in a major new technology if the private sector is left to its own
devices. How do governments decide whether, when and how to create
industry-government partnerships or other forms of encouragement to
regain that leadership? Is Fred Bergsten right in his assertion that there
is a fundamental tension between markets and governments in the new
global setting? Is it true that virtually no product can be considered intrinsically "labor intensive" given today's advances in manufacturing and
processing technology? What are the implications of this for government
policy? Of multinationals' policy?
A graphic way of looking at the industry situation is through the use
of the "S-Curve." Successful companies have realized that they must
quickly leave the old S-Curve of Management. They know that it is no
longer sufficient simply to move upward on that old curve. That entire
curve has been made irrelevant by world forces of change, especially the
dramatic acceleration of technology, the associated shorter product life
cycles, changed worker skills and the growing strength of foreign competition. The challenge now is to jump to a totally new S-Curve which
reflects the fundamental discontinuity in business management practices
brought on by these forces of change. Examples of leading company
changes in this regard, and with respect to the old and new S-Curves, are:
1) Viewing labor as a cost rather than a body of expandable knowledge and skills and as the firm's major and renewable asset maximizing "thoughtware";
2) Changing specialization of labor to systems management, flexibil-
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ity and fewer labor skill categories, with each worker having much
wider responsibilities;
3) Providing quality by designing producibility and reliability into
the product and the production system from the beginning, and by
monitoring the entire production process rather than providing
quality by inspecting the end product;
4) Switching from the use of a dedicated, automated manufacturing
facility to produce large volumes of a few product variations for
one industry to the use of a flexibly automated plant for short or
long production runs of thousands of different products for many
different industries;
5) Determining customer needs, and investing in designing and producing new products to fill those needs on a continuous basis as
opposed to getting customers to buy what the company produces;
6) Switching to collaborative research and development, or shared
use of a manufacturing facility rather than going it alone;
7) Eliminating causes of consumer complaints instead of expending
resources on a highly efficient consumer complaint system;
8) Building up long-term capability and market share - the Japanese view market share as an investment - rather than concentrating on short-term profits; and
9) Updating existing accounting systems to new accounting systems
which, for example, treat manufacturing software as an asset, not
an expense; inventory as a liability not an asset; the acceptance of
real time that a product is actually worked on in a manufacturing
operation as a key criterion of efficiency; and viewing high quality
not simply as an objective but as a precondition to
competitiveness.
Successful companies acknowledge that we are in a new era which
involves a change not just of degree, but of kind. They know that we
cannot survive by simply increasing existing efforts and using existing
methodology. That will only delay the inevitable. The rule book is only
now being written, but they know that it is a game of speed, agility and
entrepreneurial initiative. It is a game of constant change, not stability.
Winning at this game is not just a matter of playing harder or doing a
few new things. It often involves new management technologies, new
accounting systems, new cooperative strategies with other firms and new
methods of bringing this new technology to the marketplace. But what
about companies that do not see this or are unable to react sufficiently?
Is there a government role?
Perhaps the single most important imperative for both industry and
government is to manage continuous change better. If we do not consciously manage that change, it will manage us and, equally undesirable,
the source of some of that management may come from elsewhere. In
short, since change is inevitable, we must lead it or adapt to it. The
alternative is to be consumed by it.
Some commentators see a general decline in our competitiveness
and, in particular, the U.S. ability to convert new technological ideas into
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new products and processes for the world marketplace. Is this assertion
true? If so, what are the respective and cooperative roles that must be
played by business and government? Is there a growing legitimacy of a
federal role in the technological arena, in addition to traditional roles
such as national defense, assisting a fragmented industry such as agriculture or stimulating research for limited, yet socially desireable, markets
as orphan drugs? It is simple to justify government support for basic
research or science, more difficult for civilian technology creation, and
questionable for the effective management of technology in the private
sector. That may be the primary challenge for competitive strength.
Are we, as a nation, prepared to accept, as some argue, that the
rules of the game have changed so dramatically? That because of the
way other countries pursue their national interest we must explore more
innovative responses in order to survive economically?
Along these lines, let me speculate on a possible critical difference
between the U.S. and Japanese approaches to the commercialization of
technology. Imagine that both countries want to build the next generation widget and that multiple technologies are involved, for instance, new
materials, a new engine and new electronics. The United States will concentrate its resources and produce an outstanding widget, possibly with
some fortuitous spin-offs to other products. The Japanese on the other
hand will not view the widget as the end product at all. Rather, they see
right away the hundreds of possible applications in many different industries, not just in products, but in services. That is their genius, converting what appears to be a $100 million widget market to a $100 billion
market in multiple products. That is their strategic objective from the
beginning and they have the industrial and financial structure to accomplish that objective.
Historically, one of the unspoken premises underlying the relationship between government and industry is that the private sector, because
it is driven by the profit motive, is infinitely aggressive. It is assumed
that business will see and quickly seize any new market opportunity, any
new product idea and any new strategic opportunity that will give it an
advantage over its competition. Correspondingly, it has been assumed
that the major goal of government is to hold that aggressiveness in check
in order to protect the individual citizens and others from its excesses.
Too often, this role has led to fundamental antagonism between government and business. Just as we have found that no matter how vast the
oceans and skies may appear, they can tolerate only so much interference
before the ecosystem is damaged, the same is true in industry. Over the
decades this mutual distrust can damage the "business ecology" with the
result that the private sector often lacks the resiliency it needs to contend
with the massive changes it must now make. Make no mistake, the welfare of every U.S. citizen is at stake because it is directly tied to the success and competitiveness of U.S. industry. In a time of major change,
such as now, U.S. firms need all the leadership and encouragement they

CANADA-UNITED

STATES LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 15:219 1989

can get. Americans do not need the government to provide more policing of industry, but rather, government needs to remove unnecessary barriers and provide incentives for the free market to work its own magic, as
we know it can.
U.S.

GOVERNMENT INITIATIVES

In the area of commercializing federally funded technology, which
now amounts to approximately $65 billion or one-half of all U.S. research and development, recent policy changes have substantially increased the contribution of that technology to business competitiveness.
In 1980, the Bayh-Dole Act2 was passed, allowing universities and small
businesses to own inventions made by them with federal funding, and
requiring universities to share royalties with their inventors. This has
been quite successful in promoting cooperation between industry and
universities with an increase of 74% up to 1987.
In 1986 with the Technology Transfer Act, which applies to government-owned and operated laboratories, the Administration and Congress
again recognized that technology will rarely be translated successfully
into commercial products without the full cooperation and involvement
of the people who created it; that there must be early interaction between
the creators of that technology and those who understand the complexities of manufacturing and marketing it; and that to make such cooperation work best requires powerful incentives. Accordingly, the
Technology Transfer Act of 1986 called upon federal agency heads to
delegate to laboratory directors the authority to enter into cooperative
research and development agreements with the.private sector and other
entities, and to agree in advance on the intellectual property rights the
cooperating parties would have in any resulting inventions made by a
federal employee. It also required that the federal inventor receive a
share of the royalties received by the government. The Act also made
technology transfer a laboratory responsibility to the extent consistent
with its mission. Each federal agency is free to design its own system of
decentralization and incentives under these broad guidelines. To date,
over one hundred cooperative agreements have been negotiated or are in
their final stages.
An example of organizational innovation under the Technology
Transfer Act is the Illinois Biotechnology Consortium which combines
the resources of the Department of Agriculture's Northern Research
Center, the University of Illinois, six private companies contributing $1
million each, the State of Illinois and the city of Peoria.
Another aspect of the federal government's policy in this area relates to international considerations. In the 1980 Bayh-Dole Act, Congress forbade non-profit contractors, chiefly universities, who took title to
2

Pub. L. No. 96-517 (1980).
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federally financed inventions from giving exclusive licenses to firms that
did not agree to manufacture the invention in the United States. In the
1986 Technology Transfer Act, Congress instructed federal laboratories
not to enter into cooperative agreements with foreign countries that deny
U.S. entities the right to enter similar ventures in their countries; U.S.
laboratory directors now have to consider such foreign practices in terms
of reciprocity. In a subsequent Executive Order, the President of the
United States required lab directors to also consider the extent to which
the prospective foreign government participant protects intellectual
property. Most recently in 1988, the Trade and Competitiveness Act requires that federally supported international science and technology
agreements be negotiated so as to ensure that the United States enjoys
similar access to the research facilities of the other countries, and that
proposed science and technology agreements be reviewed for their consistency with the principles of the 1980 and 1986 laws previously
mentioned.
Another issue relates to the copyrighting of computer software in
government-owned and operated laboratories. Our copyright law prohibits federal employees from obtaining copyright protection. This
means that, unlike the situation for patents, federal labs cannot transfer
any intellectual property rights in copyrightable materials. Federally developed software may need much time and money to be spent by the
private sector before it is commercially valuable. Without an appropriate
license, a firm may not be assured of recouping that investment.
Still another form of government involvement in innovation is the
Industry-University Cooperative Research Centers Program and the Engineering Research Centers Program, which are both National Science
Foundation programs. The former was initiated in 1973 to stimulate
university-industry interaction on fundamental scientific and engineering
research important to technological innovation and industrial development. A significant proportion of each center's support comes from industrial, state and other funds. Eventually they become self-sufficient.
Generally, the actual research agenda is established by the participating
researchers and firms and focuses on topics of interest to those firms. I
believe there are forty of these centers in operation.
The other program, the Engineering Research Centers, which also
receives non-federal support, was initiated in 1985. Its purpose is to enhance the competitiveness of U.S. industry by sponsoring major crossdisciplinary research and education centers at universities. Specific technological areas covered to date include manufacturing and design;
materials processing; optoelectronics, microelectronics, and telecommunications; biotechnology and bioengineering; and resource utilization and
recovery. Both of these programs emphasize "market pull," in contrast
to "technology push."
The private sector funds the other half of U.S. industrial research
and development. The government attempts to stimulate its commercial-
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ization into new products and processes in several ways. One is the 1984
liberalization of the application of U.S. antitrust law to cooperative research and development ventures. About 130 cooperative ventures have
registered with the federal government under the 1984 Act, which eliminates treble damages and requires use of the "rule of reason" in court
proceedings. The Commerce Department has a small initiative which
assists the formation of such consortia. A recent example of the Department's "convener role" in this area was a meeting initiated last month by
Sarnoff Laboratories to create a consortium to develop optical interconnectors in microcircuits. Helping to catalyze such important consortia
can be challenging to the legal profession because each consortium is
unique in terms of its objectives, which run the gamut from meeting a
regulatory requirement or meeting foreign competition to finding an alternative technology, such as a better glass bottle to compete with plastic
bottles. Such consortia are also unique in terms of membership, the handling of intellectual property, who performs research and in other
matters.
Another role of the federal government is to protect U.S. intellectual
property abroad. There are major problems in certain countries which,
for example, offer no protection for pharmaceutical patents, infringe our
process patents and require compulsory licensing. We may lose $50 billion a year in sales as a result.
Still other key government roles are: to provide results of government scientific and technical research, such as through the National
Technical Information Service; to provide standards and reference
materials through the National Institute for Standards and Technology;
to provide seed funding through the Small Business Innovation Research
Program; to stimulate weapons-related research through defense programs; to make awards such as the National Medals of Science and
Technology and the Malcolm Baldrige Quality Award; to provide tax
incentives through the Research and Experimentation tax credit; to encourage the private sector to create flexible computer-integrated manufacturing centers, including those that can be shared by numerous
companies and also operate as advanced manufacturing training centers;
and to help keep the cost of capital low, thus aiding a firm to focus on
long-term needs.
Some observers perceive that the promotion of U.S. competitiveness
should be an objective of all U.S. government agencies, not just the Commerce Department and the U.S. Trade Representative but others as well.
Some of the other government agencies include the Office of Science and
Technology Policy, the Federal Reserve System (impact of monetary policy and interest rates), the Treasury Department (fiscal policy, IRS tax
rulings), the Justice Department (antitrust), the Defense Department
(stimulation of innovation through research and procurement), the Departments of Education and Labor (human resources), regulatory agencies (e.g., the environment, worker and consumer protection) and the
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Office of Management and Budget. The key point here is that science
and technology policy cannot be effective unless two other things are
present: first, the integration with the other policies just mentioned and
second, the orientation of all of these policies towards fostering competitiveness in world markets. Associated with this is the equally important
objective of more integration between the three stages of innovation science, technology creation and technology commercialization and applications, including manufacturing. There can be no U.S. economic or
military security without a competitive manufacturing base.
On April 4, President Bush announced the establishment of a White
House Council on Competitiveness, to be chaired by Vice-President
Quayle. The following is the accompanying statement:
The continued economic progress of the United States demands that
we maintain and improve our international competitiveness. Our ability to do that depends on the full development of our human resource
potential, promotion of scientific and technological progress, removal
of barriers to innovation, careful assessment of any governmentally imposed burdens on the free enterprise system, and removal of domestic
barriers to the flow of goods and services.
Clearly the role of a government such as the United States, given the
strong historical commitment to free enterprise, is one not of controlling
the innovation process, but of stimulating it through removal of barriers,
provision of incentives and the provision of information and catalytic
services. This includes doing what is possible to keep the cost of capital
low which, in turn, means lowering the deficit.
Examples of recent initiatives show that the United States is looking
beyond research and development into the later stages of the innovation
process, such as current interest in protecting joint manufacturing ventures from antitrust liability, and the Commerce Department's leadership
in helping to stimulate industry's use of advanced, flexible, computerintegrated manufacturing. Again, a strong domestic technology-based
industrial core is essential not only to both onshore, high quality military
procurement, but also to U.S. industrial competitiveness goals. These
two goals are becoming inseparable.
In the case of research and development for "big technology," the
private sector should provide the leadership and funding. One vehicle
sometimes mentioned is a consortium or a set of consortia, each specializing in one aspect or market niche and sharing information to assist in
making long-term strategic decisions based on technological trends, possible market applications and processing advances. It is industry, not
government, which must develop the strategic business plan such as in
high-definition television or superconductivity and in the possible establishment of consortia. If the government is to play a role in such "big
technologies," industry should be prepared to first define convincingly
and logically what that role should be. Becoming competitive is industry's job in the final analysis. In the case of superconductivity, for exam-
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ple, the new National Commission on Superconductivity is an important
mechanism for organizing and promoting the development of this important technology - at least until a strong industry presence develops. Finally, creation of the new post of Under Secretary for Technology in the
Commerce Department will help ensure that science and technology advocates get the attention they deserve, have the clout to get the job done
and that their views are heard in the context of a more competitive
nation.

